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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXII May, 1934 Number 4
TESTAMENTARY REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT
INSTRUMENT
By ALviN E. EVANS*
Wills may be revoked by act to the document, by operation
of law and by subsequent instrument. This discussion is con-
fined to the latter method. It does not deal with such closely
related matters as revival, revocation occasioned or prevented
by fraud, nor as far as may be avoided, with dependent relative
revocation. These latter matters are not peculiar to revocation
by subsequent instrument and they deserve and have largely re-
ceived adequate treatment elsewhere.
The subsequent revocation may, of course, be by will or by
codicil and in most states by a "writing declaring the same"
executed in the manner required for the execution of a will.
The will or codicil may contain an express revoking clause, or
it may be inconsistent totally or partially. No question here
arises, however, as to the possibility of partial revocation, since
the question whether it is possible or not becomes a problem
only when the attempt is made by an act to the document.
The two oatstanding factors are: (a) inconsistency gen-
erally of the later writing with the earlier will, and (b) incon-
sistency coupled with the fact that the provisions of the later
inconsistent instrument cannot operate, due to some statute or
legal rule. Mfore incidental are such inquiries as these matters
(c) the revocatory effect of such expressions as "this is my last
will"; (d) whether an invalidly executed will may be rev-
ocatory; (e) whether a subsequent will inconsistent in its dis-
* Alvin E. Evans, A. B. 1898, Cotner Univ.; A. M. 1898, Univ. of
Nebraska; Ph. D. 1908, J. D. 1919, Univ. of Mich.; attended Harvard
Law School, 1915-1916; Dean and Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kentucky Col-
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positions with the earlier one revokes by silence the appointment
of executors without naming others; and (f) whether a non-
dispositive revocatory writing should be probated.
This is My Last Wilt. This expression once was believed to
be significant of an intention to revoke, inas.ueh as according
to Swinburne, one can leave only one last will or testament. But
a rule has developed involving a process of integration whereby
it has been decided that a will, generically, may consist of
several specific wills so far as they are consistent, that just as a
will need not consist of a single sheet nor be prepared at a single
sitting, so it need not, as a whole, be comprehended within a
single act of final execution. No effect at all is given to the ex-
pression in some states and it is regarded as simply a generic
expression and equals "this is my will" and so is not to be
treated as a revocatory clause in any sense. Sometimes it is
regarded as one of many elements to be considered in determin-
ing whether the earlier will is revoked. On the whole, it seems
to have of itself no revocatory effect whatever.'
The Revocatory Clause. A revocatory clause will revoke a
former will whether or not it is contained within a will which
completely disposes of the testator's property.2 Such effect may
not be intended as, for example, it may have been inserted by
the draftsman, who was ignorant of its effect, the instrument
being intended only as a codicil, but if its presence were known
to the testator it will not be disregarded. In Collins v. Ellstone,s
the testator had protested that he did not desire to revoke his
former will but was persuaded to allow the revocatory clause to
stand because, as explained to him, it was purely formal and had
1Plenty v. West, 9 Jur. 458 (1845)-"This is my last Vill" revokes
former wills. Lemage v. Goodban, L. R. 1 P. & D. 5T (1'qi) (No effect
given to similar words); Leslie v. Leslie, 6 Ir. Eq. Z39 (1872) (These
words have no weight whatever); Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94
N. W. 705 (1903), 87 Neb. 455, 127 N. W. 904 (See 89 N. W. 451) (No
weight). Venable's Will, 127 N. C. 344, 37 S. U. 465 (1900) (no weight).
In Simpson v. Foxan (1907), P. 54, a will containing the words, "This
Is my last and only will" did not revoke a prior will, since it did not
make a full disposition of the property. The term Is a mere generic
phrase. The common usage the world over is to employ the words
"will," "testament" and "last will and testament" as exactly
synonymous, Hill v. Hill, 7 Wash. 409, 35 Pac. 360 (1893). See also
Gordon v. Whitlock, 92 Va. 723, 24 S. E. 342 (1896), "my will Is as
follows"-not revocatory;Fry v. Fry, 125 Ia. 424, 101 N. W. 144 (1904);
Freeman v. Freeman, 5 De G. M. & G. 704 (Ch. 1854).2Pieront v. Patrick, 53 N. Y. 591 (1873).
3 (1893) P. 1.
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no effect. If, however, its presence had not been called to the
testator's attention it might have been omitted from probate.4
Our own courts have, in some cases, been more successful in cases
of the Collins v. Ellstone type. Thus, in Rickard v. Rickard5 the
testator had devised certain premises to A for life and made his
wife the residuary beneficiary. Later, by codicil, he declared,
"This will have no effect," assigning certain conduct of A
as the ground for the revocation. It was held that it was a ques-
tion for the jury whether the testator intended to revoke the
entire will. So, in Owens v. Fahnestock,6 a testator executed a
will, numbering in it nine items. Having forgotten to name an
attorney, he prepared a holograph and, after reciting that he re-
Yoked all former wills, he named hn attorney as item ten. The
court held that there was no intention to revoke the former
items--one to nine. It seems unnecessary to urge, in support of
the result, that the second instrument was, in effect, a codicil
and though it may not repitblish the will, it may be integrated
with the will, so that the two are one will with the revocatory
clause coming in a rather unusual place in the will and creating
at most a latent ambiguity. The same principle might well have
been applied to Collins v. Ellstone, that a will in form, is to be
regarded as a codicil if it is a mere appendage, addition to or
alteration of a prior will. That is to say, a general revocatory
clause in a codicil may well be regarded as revoking all other
wills save the will of which it is a part. There is no occasion
to denominate a paper a codicil if it entirely revokes the very
instrument it supplements. The context will generally indicate
whether the paper is a will or a codicil, whatever name is at-
tached to it. So in this case the later instrument, being clearly
supplementary and intended as a codicil, might well have been
construed as a codicil and so revocatory of all instruments prior
to the will it supplements. Indeed, it is easier to avoid the rev-
ocation here than in Denny v. Barton,7 where the revocatory
' Goods of Oswald, L. R. 3 P. & D. 162 (1874). Goods of Moore,
1892 P. 378. Goods of Wray, Ir. R. 10 Eq. 266 (1876). Cf. Hppesley v.
Homer, T. & R. 48 Note (Ch. 1804).
5134 Va 485, 115 S. E. 369 (1922).
'110 S. C. 130, 96 S. E. 557 (1918), cf. 32 Harv. L. Rev. 183 (1919).
The dicta in Smith v. McChesney, 15 N. J. Eq. 359 (1862) and Van
Wert v. Benedict, 1 Bradf. 114 (Sur. N. Y. 1856) are without value.
72 Phill. 575 (Eec. 1818). See also Gladstone v. Tempest, 2 Curt.
650 (Ece. 1840) (drafts drawn in favor of servants on testator's banker
and delivered to the beneficiaries not to be presented during testator's
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clause was held inapplicable to a letter which, in fact, was testa-
mentary but which testator did not consider so. 8 The well
established rule is that a mistake in or a misunderstanding of
the effect of language intentionally used does not afford occasion
for a court to give an unusual construction to plain languageY
The question, what forms a mere revocation should assume,
frequently arises.10 The English courts have given effect to the
apparent intent of the testator. So such declarations as "Mr.
George is in possession of my will. I am unable to destroy it
myself, but I desire that he destroy it" have been regarded as
sufficient to revoke, and the actual destruction of it by the per-
son so directed would have no significance, as the revocation is
by writing and not by act to the document." Some American
life and intended to operate independently of the executors, held to
be testamentary but not revoked by a general revoking clause). In
Goods of Howard, L. R. 1 P. & D. 636 (1869), a codicil revoking the
bequests in the will and naming three persons as executors did not
revoke the appointment of executors in the will, which also devised
realty.
8 See Robinson v. Clarke, L. R. 2 P. D. 269 (1877) (Though sec-
ond will contained a revocatory clause, the prior one was probated
with it by consent of the parties); Powell v. Mouchett, 6 Madd. 216
(V. C. 1821) (An issue was directed whether the revocatory clause
was a part of the will.)9Barker v. Cor., 110 Mass. 477 (1872); Iddings v. Iddings, 7 S. &
R. 111 (Pa. 1821). (Will directed the executor not to cancel the ao.
counts with testator's children. He meant the exact reverse but did
not comprehend the meaning of "to cancel".)
'0 In Cranvel v. Sanders, Cro. Jac. 497 (K. B. 1618), it is said that
if testator say that "my will shall not stand or I intend to revoke my
will," this is no revocation, but if he say, "I do revoke my will" this Is
a revocation. A power of attorney to deal with property already devised
is not a revocation, though the instrument may be sufficiently executed
as a will and though, if executed, there would be nothing on which
the will could operate, In re Kilborn, 5 Cal. App. 161, 89 P. 985 (1907).
2Walcott v. Ochterony, 1 Curt. 580 (Ecc. 1837). See also In re
Durance, L. R. 2 P. & D. 406 (1872) (a signed, attested and subscribed
letter to testator's brother, "to get the will and burn it"); Toomer v.
Sobinska (1907) P. 106 ("I hereby declare that my will which Is not
in my possession and..which I am unable to destroy is null and void
and I intend to express my wishes in a will to be executed shortly.")
Goods of Hicks, L. R. 1 P. & D. 683 (1869) (This my last will is hereby
cancelled and I have made no other); Re Fraser, L. R. 2 P. & D. 183
(1870) (This will is cancelled this day); Goods of Eyre (1905) 2 I. R.
540 (Letter directed daughter to destroy testator's will). Goods of
Hubbard, L. R. 1 P. & D. 53 (1865) (Testatrix executed a codicil re-
voking all other /codicils and appointed an executor under her Nill.
She had executed a deed but no will. Court held it could not gIant
probate of a testamentary paper unless it took effect upon something.
Administration was granted to the next of kin with codicil annexed).
In England now administration is granted with a note referring to the
writing of revocation but without annexing the revocation to the
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courts are more strict, and several courts have held that similar
expressions were not sufficient, because the testator intended to
revoke by destructive act rather than by written instrument.
Thus, the following signed, attested and subscribed letter was in-
sufficient: "Dr. Kennedy: Please destroy the will I made in
favor of Thomas Hart."'1 2 A less strict view permits the fol-
lowing words to amount to a revocation when properly ex-
ecuted: "Mly former will (identified) has been lost, destroyed
or stolen and said will is void as a new one has been made."1 3
Revocation by Later Instrument Not Duly Executed as a
Will. The other writing not a will, in order to revoke must,
under statutes following the Wills Act, be executed in the same
manner as wills are executed. Perhaps in two states which fol-
low the Statute of Frauds, such writing, if signed, need not be
grant. See 16 Halsbury's Laws, "Executors and Admnistrators," 195.
A soldier's will may be revoked by his own unattested letter. Estate
of Gossage (1921), P. 194 (Letter to sister to get will and burn it, as
testator had canceled it). But a mere accidental destruction cannot
be ratified so as to become a revocation. In re Booth (1926), P. 118.
'2In re McGill's Will, 229 N. Y. 405, 128 N. E. 194 (1920). See
33 Harv. L. Rev. 566 (1920); ib. 620. But in Backhus' Will, 63 N. Y. S.
544 (App. D. 1900), it was held that the expression found in a trust
deed, "I hereby revoke, cancel and annul any last will heretofore
made by me," was a revocation. In Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. -286
(1863), a letter by testator to his attorney in fact to destroy testator's
will was held not to be a revocation, stress being laid upon the in-
tended manner of revocation. It is not clear what would have been
the holding in the following two jurisdictions if the allegedly re-
voking Instrument had been properly executed. Newboles v. Yew-
boles, 169 Ark. 282, 273 S. W. 1026 (1925): "This is to certify
that I have this day decided not to will my land to my son
James." The insufficiency consisted in a witness signing his name as
a notary public and having made a cross for the signature of the
testator without explanation; Harris v. McDonald, 152 Ga. 18, 108 S. E.
448 (1921) (Testator wrote to the Ordinary to cancel the record of
her will If recorded and to turn it over to Mr. Neale and "Mr. Neale
will please destroy the will as it is worthless and not according to
my desire. This letter is to be preserved as authority." Only two
witnesses attested and subscribed it).
"Luther v. Luther, 211 Ala. 352, 100 So. 497 (1924). See also
Bayley v. Bailey, 5 Cush. 245 (Mass. 1849) (A properly executed in-
strument read: "It is my wish that my will be destroyed and my
estate settled according to law"). Where erasures and interlineations
are made and there is a full re-execution of the instrument, the revoca-
tion Is effective pro tanto, the same as if an entirely new will had been
prepared, Goods of Gosling, 11 P. D. 79 (1886). See also Kohi's Estate,
172 Mich. 342, 137 N. W. 735 (1912) (Testator re-executed by drawing
dry pen through his name and having other attesters subscribe, thereby
validating Interlineations and obliterations).
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attested and subscribed. 14 In an early and important case,
Onions v. Tyrer,15 it was held that the revoking clause would
not operate apart from the will, which was insufficiently exe-
cuted to dispose of property. This seems to be a desirable and
sound result. It certainly was not intended to operate independ-
ently of the will.
It may safely be proposed now, save as above qualified,
that neither inconsistency nor the revocatory clause in an insuffi-
ciently executed will has any effect.1 6 In states where an ex-
ecutor is a disqualified attester it has likewise been held that
the revocatory clause fails as, for example, where the wife of
the executor became an attester. 17
R VOCATION BY INCONSISTENT VALID INSTRUMENT
A will may be revoked by a subsequent writing which ex-
pressly revokes, or by one which is inconsistent. If the earlier
paper gives a specific bequest to A and the later one gives the
same bequest to B, there is an inconsistency. If the later also
gives the same specific bequest to A, there is no inconsistency,
but the gift will pass by the later will, thus rendering the earlier
provision inoperative.1 8 So if the earlier will gives a general
legacy to A and the later will also gives to A the same sum, there
again is no inconsistency. The first becomes inoperative if there
is no cumulation, but is operative if there is a cumulation. The
same is true where the later will merely makes a gift of a differ-
ent sum to the same legatee to the degree that the two gifts are
coextensive if there is no cumulation. In case the later gift is
14 Florida and Maryland. See Bordwell Statute Law of Wills, 14 Ia.
L. Rev. 285-7 (1929).
IB2 Vern. 742 (Ch. 1717). Roper v. Ratciffe, 5 Bro. P. C. 360, 2
Rep. 731, 8 Vin. Abr. 141, Devise R. (H. of L. 1714) and dictum in
Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, 82 A. 98 (1911). But see Rolle Abr.
Devise P. 72. At one time in North Carolina a revocation of a devise
could be accomplished by an unsigned and unattested writing. See
Clark v. Eborn, 6 N. C. 235 (1813).
10 Jenner v. Finch, 5 P. D. 106 (1879); Harris v. McDonald, 152 Ga.
18, 108 S. E. 448 (1921); Voorhis' Will, 7 N. Y. S. 596 (Sup. Ct. 1889);
Leard v. Askew, 28 Okla. 300, 114'P. 251 (1911); Reese v. Probate
Court, 9 R. I. 434 (1870). See also Appeal of O'Brien, 120 Me. 434,
115 A. 169 (1921) and Golsticker's Will, 192 N. Y. 35, 84 N. E. 5SI
(1908) (Later will refused probate for lack of capacity, cannot be
used to, show revocation of an earlier will. The former decision is
res judicata). Cf. 33 Harv. L. Rev. 620 (1920).
"Moore v. Rowlett, 269 Ill. 88, 109 N. E. 682 (1915).
-Lemage v. Goodban, L. R. 1, P. & D. 5T (1865).
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a gift of a lesser sum and the instrument is for some reason in-
operative, the first one should continue operative to the extent
that it is not superseded.
Various minute rules have been worked out for enabling a
court to determine whether a later gift is cumulative or not, 19
such as (a) the consideration whether or not the later gift is
made for the same purpose as the earlier one; (b) whether or
not some of the repeated gifts are specific;20 (c) whether the
estate is sufficient to pay cumulations; (d) whether the testator
has provided more than once for debts and funeral expenses.
If the two instruments are duplicates, that is if the dates and
the contents are identical, or if two identical provisions are
made in the same instrument, there is no cumulation. 21 If they
are undated or bear the same date and are inconsistent, they
both fail to the extent of their inconsistency unless intrinsic
evidence shows which is, in fact, later.22 If no hint comes from
any intrinsic evidence, then a good many courts allow the intro-
duction of extrinsic evidence. If the later will contains a
residuary clause, extrinsic evidence of intent that both shall
stand is generally not admitted. If it should be decided that
the later provisions are not cumulative, then it is fair to con-
clude that since the repeated gifts are substitutional and the
earlier will is in that respect inoperative, so it is inoperative as
to the provisions omitted but not expressly revoked. This may
be called perhaps one form of revocation. Thus, revocation may
be (a) either express, or (b) arise from inconsistency, as by
giving a thing to B which had formerly been given to A, or (c)
by the substitution of a new plan for the old one, even though
there may be sufficient estate left to pay the omitted provisions,
for the disposition of which no residuary clause has been
inserted. This latter method may fairly be called substitution
rather than revocation. In such event, if the substitution should
prove to be inoperative, the original provision should operate,
because a substitution rather than a revocation was intended.
29 See 2 Jarman on Wills (7th Ed. 1930, pp. 1088-1098; 2 Williams
on Executors (12th Ed. 1930, pp. 838-843); 2 Page on Wills (2d Ed.
1926) Sees. 1380-1387.
Sanford. v. Vaughan, 1 Phill. 39 (Eec. 1809).
Godolphin, "The Orphan's Legacy" (4th .Ed. 1701), Pt. 3 C. 26,
S. 46, p. 166.
"Townsend v. Moore (1905), P. 66; In re Forman, 54 Barb. 274
(N. Y. 1869).
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The final test of inconsistency is affected by two matters:
(a) whether the later instrument is a will or a codicil, and (b)
whether the function of the probate court in such situations is
one of integration or of construction, or both.
Thus, if the later instrument is a codicil, a greater attempt
is made to render both instruments operative. The codicil is
used by Godolphin as the illustration when he says that cumu-
lation is favored. Yet there are cases where cumulation is
favored as the appropriate interpretation of a later will. A pre-
sumption amounting to a maxim has sometimes been invoked in
such cases, e. g., the intention previously expressed is presumed
to continue. 23 This presumption may apply either to a will or a
codicil, so it takes one of two forms, (a) a codicil disturbs the
disposition made in a will no further than is absolutely neces-
sary,24 and (b) in the case of a will, "The court favors both
wills.' '25
This proposition respecting codicils, that a codicil disturbs
the dispositions of the will as little as possible, has been carried
to absurd lengths in some cases. Thus, where a legatee of an
integral legacy was also given a proportional share in the resi.
due, and by codicil others were added, it has been held that
such added legatees did not share in the residue, because that
would disturb the original disposition. So, hlso, if a residuary
legatee were eliminated by codicil, the remaining residuary
legatees did not take the entire residue, though if the will and
the codicil were read together, it is clear that in the one case
the added legatee is in the same position as if he had been men-
tioned in the original will, and in the second case, the will should
be read as if the eliminated legatee had never been mentioned.2 6
Thus, the principle of republication, that a will is restated as
amended, at the date of the codicil, was broken in upon. The
-"Franklin v. Jacobs, 28 Ariz. 187, 236 P. 694 (1925) (An un-
ambiguous will not revoked by a codicil possibly ambiguous).
OWardner v. Baptist Mem. Church, 232 Ill. 606, 83 N. E. 1077(i908). Vestal v. Garrett, 197 Ill. 398, 64 N. E. 345 (1902). Meckel v.
Johnson, 231 Ill. 365, 83 N. E. 209 (1907). For appropriate applica-
tions of the rule see Norten. v. Moren, 206 Ky. 415, 427, 267 S. W. 171(1924); ighttoot v. Beard, 230 Ky. 488, 20 S. W. (2d) 90 (1929). A
much more questionable application of the presumption wds made in
Garvin v. Garvin, 2 Ky. Opin. 564 (1867).
Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, 82 A. 988 (1911); Williams v.
Miles, supra, n. 1.
10 See 40 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 85-90.
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quarrel, however, with the rule that previous gifts are not to be
disturbed more than necessary is not so much a quarrel with the
principle generally, but with the rigorous application of it where
the intent of the testator is defeated. Thus, in Waln's Estate,27
the testator gave the residue to his four sisters and a brother
eqlually. The brother and one sister predeceased the testator.
By codicil, the testator revoked the gift to his brother, but said
nothing about the death of the sister. The court held that he
(lied intestate, not only as to the share left to the sister, but also
as to the share left to the brother.
On the whole, it is true that a codicil is more closely con-
strued with a prior will than is a later independent instrument.
That is, in some cases a cumulation would be inferred if the
later instrument were a codicil and not if it were a will. It
seems clear that a provision in a will which is not repeated in
the codicil would usually stand, though there may be a non-
cumulative provision in the codicil. If the later paper is a will,
the omitted provision would not stand. But it requires but small
evidence, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, to find that a legacy of
the same sum or of an increased sum in the codicil is not cumu-
lative.28
In Lovering v. Balsh,2 9 the court emphasized the evident
proposition that a will and codicil should be construed together.
Testator had divided the remainder among his children after a
life estate in the wife. One daughter having become danger-
ously ill, he executed a codicil to the effect that if she should die
leaving no child, then the income from her share should go to
her husband for life and at his death the corpus should be
divided among the other children. The daughter survived the
testator and died, leaving a husband but no issue. It was held
that the testator meant the codicil to be operative only in case
his daughter should predecease him. The same result should
be reached if the second instrument had been a separate will.
So in Re Gilman,30 the testator, by his first will, gave a legacy
to Al and a large legacy to his wife, six legacies to as many em-
ployees and named an executor. There was no residuary clause.
"156 Pa. 194, 27 A. 59 (1893).
ganford v. Vaughan, supra, n. 20.
0 210 Mass.,105, 96 N. E. 142 (1911).
ao 121 N. Y. S. 909 (Sur. 1909).
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Important changes in circumstances thereafter occurred, among
them the death of his wife and the fact that he ceased operating
his business. By the second will, the legacy to M was halved;
the amount formerly intended for his wife was distributed
among the members of her family; the names of five former
employees were omitted, and the legacy to one was repeated. It
appears also that the later will could be interpreted as disposing
of the entire estate. If the later instrument had been a codicil,
it seems probable that the same result would have been reached.
A later writing may be construed as inconsistent; (a) be-
cause a different scheme of distribution has been chosen, though
there is a residue undisposed of but no residuary clause exists, or
(b) because a complete substitution has been made and there is
no residue, or (c) because the presence of a residuary clause indi-
cates that a substitution has been determined upon by the tes-
tator. In the latter case it would make no difference whether
the residuary legatees were identical with those in the former
will or were wholly different, since the former will became in-
operative by virtue of the substitution.
The court's concept of its function, whether of integration
or construction, is important, but the two processes can hardly
be separated.3 1 Thus, a probate court cannot appropriately
probate all duly executed wills that have not been expressly re-
voked and leave it to a construction court to determine the appli-
cation of each to the estate to be distributed. In the very proc-
ess of integrating the wills offered for probate, the court must
construe them in order to find what plans of the testator have
been abandoned. Sometimes we find the probate court fearful
that a construction court may allow gifts to be cumulative which
the probate court thinks were not intended to be so, 32 and for
that reason will refuse probate to a will or to a portion of a will
which might otherwise have been proved. It seems that the pro-
bate court should not look forward to an appeal or a contest
as the appropriate means of determining how the estate shall
pass -under the will (wills) but must determine what wills have
"In DempseyJ v. Lawson, L. R. 2 P. D. 98 (1877), the court ob-
serves that its problem is what dispositions were meant by the tes-
tator rather than what instruments he intended to leave.
3Estate of Bryan (1907) P. 125; Dempsey v. Lawson, supra, n.
31; Townsend v. Moore (1905), P. 66; Methuen v. Methuen, 2 Phill.
416 (Ecc. 1817).
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hesn =exked or superseded in the- first instance in order to per-
form its function as the distributing authority. When that de-
termination is made, it may be the proper function of a construc-
tion court to pass upon the meaning and operation of those in-
struments which the probate court integrates as the last will.
If no appeal be taken from the finding of the probate court, such
finding should, after the lapse of the proper time, be res adjudi-
tata. But the construction of a probated will by the probate
court is not res adjudicata where an action for construction is
brought in a court of general jurisdiction.
If one instrument is the exact duplicate of another, there is
no inconsistency and there is but one will if they bear the same
date. Only one copy need be probated. It seems that a rev-
ocation of one copy is a revocation of the entire will as ex-
pressed in the two copies.33 It is also true that a will of a later
date identical in its substance is not a duplicate and is commonly
said to be revocatory.3 4 The sense in which revocation is here
used has been considered above. If two wills bear the same date
but are not duplicates and are inconsistent with each other,
intrinsic evidence may shfow which is later, but extrinsic evidence
for that purpose is said to inadmissible.3 5
The execution of a later will does not, of itself, revoke the
earlier one, save in Alabama.36 The contents of such later will,
if lost, must be shown to be inconsistent, or else a revocatory
clause must be proved if the first still existing will is not to
stand.37 If there is no revocatory clause, what more than mere
execution of a later will must be shown if there is to be a revoca-
1 Odenwalider v. Schoer, 8 Mo. App. 458, 464 (1880); Crossman v.
Grossman, 95 N. Y. 145 (1884); Doe v. Strickland, 8 Com. B. 724
(1849).
" O'Neall v. Purr, 1 Rich. L. 80 (S. C. 1844).
s St. Mary's Orphan Asylum v. Masterson, 122 S. W. 587 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1909).
"Bruce v. Sierra, 175 Ala. 517, 57 So. 709 (1912). But see annota-
tion to See. 10600 of Alabama Code (1923).
" Swinburne on Wills (6th Ed. 1743) 524; Seymour v. Northworthy,
Hardres 376 (Exch. 1665); Harwood v. Goodright, 1 Cowp. 87, 89, 91
(K. B. 1774); Will of Dunahugh, 130 Ia. 692, 107 N. W. 925 (1906);
Williams v. Mile,.-68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W. 705 (1903); 87 Neb. 455,
127 N. W. 904 (1910) (See 89 N. W. 451); Nelson v. McGiffert, 3 Barb.
158 (N. Y. Ch. 1848).
K. L. .- 2
KENTUCKY LAw JOuRNAL
tion in any degree I The general rule is that the inconsistency
must be such that they cannot stand together.38
This strict rule must be modified to the extent that a revo-
cation will be declared, even though there is some remainder
undisposed of if the two plans are wholly disparate and one
was intended as a substitute for the other.3 9
It may happen though, but rarely, that an entire estate can
be disposed of without leaving a residue and the fact of the
absence of a residuary clause in such cases would be unimpor-
"Lemage v. Goodban, supra, n. 18; Austin v. Oakes, 117 N. Y. 577,
23 N. E. 193 (1890).
'Plenty v. West, supra, n. 1 (First will gave the entire estate to
trustees to be divided between three persons, A, B, and C, on reach-
ing their majority. The later one gave a specific legacy to D, succes-
sive life estates in all testator's realty to several other persons, and
his copyhold to E. This left the remainder expectant upon the various
life estates undisposed of. This contrast in the disposing scheme was
held sufficient to revoke the entire will); Dempsey v. Lawson, supra,
n. 31 (There was no provision in the earlier will that was retained
in the later one unless it was the residuary clause. There was a con-
siderable residue, but the court held there was a complete change of
scheme and an entire substitution was intended); Estate of Bryan,
supra, n. 32 (No residuary clause in the later will. A and B were
made residuary legatees and executors by the first will, which also
created a trust for the benefit of S (T's sister) for life, then to N
(T's niece) for life, corpus over to N's issue. There was also another
legacy for N and one in favor of C. In the second will, A and B were
again named executors, but the remainder of the trust fund to N,
corpus over to N's children, was entirely omitted; the other legacy to
N was cut down, and C's legacy was omitted and one in favor of D
was inserted. The following considerations induced the court to hold
the former will entirely inoperative: (a) the apparently intentional
failure to name A and B residuary legatees though, repeating their
appointment as executors; (b) the failure to name N and her issue
as beneficiaries of the trust fund, but remembering N by cutting down
the other legacy; (c) each will provided for the payment of debts and
funeral expenses which later provision must be substitutional; (d)
the fact that similar legacies were made payable at a later time by
the second will. The fact that the later will but not the first was
called "my last will" was thought to be a consideration); Siemers'
Estate, 202 Cal. 424, 261 P. 298 (1927) (Payment of cumulative legacies
would require sale of the realty-no residuary clause); In re 1burg,
196 Cal. 337, 238 P. 74 (1925); Kearns v. Roush, 106 W. Va. 663, 146'
S. E. 729 (1929). Marx's Estate, 174 Cal. 762, 164 P. 640 (1917) 1s9
contra. (The second will was entirely inconsistent with the first, but
there was an undisposed of residue due to the partial inefficacy of a
gift to charity and no residuary clause. Held that the provisions of
the first will omitted in the second are to be paid. One wonders what
difference, if any, there would be in the result if there were a statute
in all cases like that in California, and whether the result in the Marx
case is a proper interpretation of that statute. See Deering's Probate
Code (1931) sec. 72 to the effect that a later will does not revoke
an earlier one unless it contains an express revocatory clause or Is
wholly inconsistent with it.
TESTAMENTARY REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT INSTRUMENT 481
tant. Thus, if one gives "all my estate" 40 there is no occasion
for a residuary clause. But the naming of various items of
realty and personalty, including bank deposits, which include
the entire estate, may do the same thing. In such case a later
wiU may revoke the earlier one by complete inconsistency, and
there is no residue.41
REVOCATION BY INCONSISTENT INOPERATIVE INSTRUMENT*
Assuming that the inoperative instrument contains no gen-
eral revocatory clause, four positions have been taken with re-
spect to the result where the later will is inconsistent with the
earlier one: (a) There is a complete revocation; (b) There is no
revocation; (c) There is a conditional revocation; (d) There
is a revocation which may be set aside upon appropriate equi-
table conditions, which leaves the original will unmolested.
4Ludlum v. Otis, 15 Hun. 410 (N. Y. 1878).
4 See, for example, Leslie v. Leslie, 6 Ir. Eq. 332 (1872) (difficult
to distinguish on the facts from Bryan's Estate, supra, n. 32);
Petchell's Goods, L. R. 3 P. & D. 153 (1874); Pepper v. Pepper, I. R. 5
Eq. 85 (1870); Goods of Hodgkinson. (1893) P. 339; Re Fisher, 4 Wis.
254 (1854); Cadell v. Wilcox (1898) P. 21; Reeves v. Reeves, 2 I. '.
521 (1909); Gardner v. McNeal, supra, n. 15; Re Armstrong's Wilt,
210 N. Y. S. 42T, 432 (Sur. 1925); Re Bradford, 1 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas.
153 (Pa. 1845); Kearns v. Roush, supra. n. 39.
* It is interesting to note some of the possible reasons why testa-
mentary instruments may be inoperative in whole or in part. Thus, it
may fail because of uncertainty (Dudley v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440, 83
N. W. 97 (1900) (gift for indefinite charitable purposes); Carpenter v.
Miller, 3 W. Va. 174 (1869) (for the propagation of the Gospel); or
because it was executed within the forbidden statutory period. (There
are many of these failures; see, for example, Melville's Estate, 245
Pa. 318, 91 A. 679 (1914); or because its purpose is illegal, e. g., Gos-
sett v. Weatherly, 58 N. C. Eq. 46 (1859) (award of freedom to a slave
In a slave state); or because it exceeds the amount permitted by
statute to be given for a particular purpose, Marx's Estate, 174 Cal.
762, 164 P. 640 (1917); or because it makes no sense (Conoway v.
Fulmer, 172 Ala. 283, 54 So. 624, 34 L. R. A. N. S. 963 (1911) (T's will
devised a given number of acres of undescribed land, but in such case
there would probably be no revocation without a revocatory clause);
or because wilt cannot be found nor its contents proved-(Covin v.
Warlord, 20 Md. 357 (1863) (a revocatory clause must be proved);
or because of the rule or statute against remoteness of vesting (e. g.,
Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 A. 163 (1898); Blakeman v.
Sears, 74 Conn. 516, 51 A. 517 (1902); U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Douglas,
134 Ky. 374, 120 S. W. 328 (1909), Re Pilsbury, 99 N. Y. S. 62 (App. D.
1905); or because the beneficiary is incapable of taking. French's Case,
1 Roll. Abr. 614 (0) (1587) (devise to a parish); Roper v. Ratcliffe,
8 Vin. Abr. 141, Devise R. (H. L. 1714); Roper v. Constable, 2 Eq. Cas.
Abr. 359 (Eng. 1713) (Devisee is a Papist); or because the beneficiaries
were dead when the will was made or predeceased the testator or all
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The first position, that a complete revocation occurs, was
clearly taken by the early English cases. 42 Baker v. Story45 is
perhaps the most significant of these cases. In the same year in
a House of Lords decision on a Scottish appeal,4 4 Lord Cairns
strangely declared, "No case can be produced where . . . a
mere alternative disposition not valid in itself has been used to
revoke an earlier and effective disposition of the same prop-
erty. "245
Duguid v. Fraser46 is the first important case which effected
a change in the course of English decisions. The testatrix had
a non-exclusive power of appointment among her children and
exercised it. On the death of one, she attempted by codicil to
appoint that share to his issue and it was held that there was no
intention to revoke. The court seems to take here the second
position, not that there was a conditional revocation, but that
there was no revocation because testatrix did not so intend.
the dispositions were made in favor of the attesters; Laughton v.
Atkins, 1 Pick. 535 (Mass. 1823) (dictum)--Cf. Moore v. Rowlett, 269
Ill. 88, 109 N. E. 682 (1915) (Where an attester is someone other than
an interested person, for in such latter case the statute validates the
will but avoids the gift. See 25 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 245 n. 29).
42French7's Case, 1 Roll, Abr: 614 (0) 4 (1587) ("Si home devise
terre al un a puis ceo xdevise al poor de tiel paroch, que est void, piUV
ceo que ils nont capacitie a prendre, encore ceo est un revocation");
Roper v. Radcliffe, supra, n. 16, discussed at length In 1924 A. 0. 653,
673 (An invalidly executed will no revocation, but an inoperative will
may revoke); Shove v. Pineke, 5 T. R. 124 (K B. 1793) (Deed will re-
voke a will, even though it may be inadequate as a conveyance);
Beard v. Beard, 3 Atk. 72 (1744) (Will revoked by deed poll though in-
operative as a deed); flx Parte Ilchester, 7 Ves. 348 (1803), was also re-
garded as taking this view (See Ward v. Van der Loeff (1924) ' A. C.
653); Tupper v. Tupper, 1 K. & J. 665 (Ch. 1855) (Express revocatory
clause in codicil revoked a prior will, giving the property to charities.
The gift to charity in lieu thereof was invalid. Court held revocation
effective as there was no way to determine the real intent); Quinn v.
Butler (L. R. 6 Eq. 225 (1868) (Exercise ol power of appointmenit.
This followed by an express revocation in a later will, and exercise
was void because power was non-exclusive. The revocation was allowed
to stand because it was not possible to learn testator's intent); Baker
v. Story, 31 L. T. N. 631 (1874) (Gift to wifq absolutely. By later
will her interest was changed to a life estate, remainder on a void gift
to charity).
438upra, n. 42.
"Alexander v. Kirkpatrick, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 397 (1874).
Lord Blandesburgh, in Ward v. Van. der Loeff, supra, n. 42, p. 685,
explains this statement by saying that reference was made to those
cases only where the later instrument was insufficiently executed as a
wilL
,31 Ch. 449 (1886).
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There was no revocatory clause as there had been in certain
earlier cases and no authority was cited whatever. 47
Ward v. Van der Loe/f4 s is a recent and elaborately argued
case in which extended opinions were written by each Viscounts
Haldane and Cave and by Lords Dunedin, Phillimore and
Blanesburgh. It appears that the testator in his will had given
his wife a power of appointment over certain property, among
the children of his brothers and sisters, without any limitation
and without mentioning any period of vesting, so that the inter-
ests of the children would vest at birth and the class to take
would be limited to those living at the death of testator's wife.
By codicil he revoked the power of appointment and declared
that the interest of any child should not vest until it, being a son,
should reach 21, or, being a daughter, should reach 21 or should
marry under that age. This provision for vesting was too re-
mote. The Chancery Court believed that there was a revocation
because of the material variation in the class to take, the varia-
tion in the terms of the gift not being discussed.
The House of Lords overruled the lower court decision and
held there was no revocation. It was the view of Viscount
Haldane4 9 that a void disposition was no revocation and the fact
that a new and different class was constituted in the codicil made
no difference if the provision was wholly inoperative. The
original gift does not fail because there was no independent in-
tention to revoke it. It thus appears that he adopted the doc-
trine of dependent relative or conditional revocation, the third
theory mentioned above.
It was Viscount Cave's view 0 that there was a mere modi-
fication of the class made in the codicil and no revocation at all,
I" In Bernard's Settlement (1916), 1 Ch. 552, the testatrix's desire
was to alter an absolute gift to one beneficiary so that it should be
held in trust and "so far and no farther" did she revoke the prior
gift. The court thought that too much emphasis had been laid in
Duguid v. Fraser on the absence of a revocatory clause. There f
obviously here no absolute revocatory clause. If she had said "I rJ
yoke in order to give effect to the trust provision, the revocation would
be absolute according to the view here taken. But, "I revoke so far
as to accomplish this purpose and no farther" seems to expressly con-
dition the revocation upon the operation: of the trust provision. The
court thought there was no distinction between express revocation and
revocation by inconsistency.
,upra, n. 42, overruling Re Burnyeat (1923), 2 Ch. 52.
4P. 661.
6P. 665.
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because none was intended. He cited earlier cases which had so
held5 ' and continued by saying that "the court discovers an in-
tention to revoke only in the altered disposition which is at-
tempted to be made by the second instrument, and if that dis-
position fails, then also the court must fail to perceive any in-
dication to revoke the first, the court not being able to find that
there is any inconsistent disposition at all in consequence of that
which was intended to be such having wholly failed to take
eZect." His view, then, is that there was no revocation.
Neither of the first two opinions discuss the earlier cases holding
that a validly executed inconsistent but inoperative will revokes
the earlier will.
Lord Dunedin5" said that if the codicil contained words of
revocation they should be given effect, but if there were no such
words, then there is no revocation, unless it is necessarily im-
plied by reason of the inconsistency of the later with the earlier
provision. Here is pretty clearly expressed the theory of revoca-
tion by inconsistency, more fully outlined later.5 3
Lord Phillimore54 relied upon the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation, repudiating the statement by Jarman, 55 that
"If the second devise fails not from the infirmity of the instru-
ment but from the incapacity of the devisee, the prior devise is
revoked." Jarman's statement, however, is fortified by the
early cases.56
51Duguid v. Fraser, supra, n. 46; AZexander v. Kirkpatriclk, supra,
n. 44; and Morley v. RennoZdson, 1 Chancery 449 (1895) (Testator by
will gave the residue to his daughter for life then over to her children
and in default of children, over. By codicil he stated that In conse-
quence of her nervous debility it was his will that she should not
marry and in case of her marriage or death, he directed that the
residue should go to those to whom the gift over had been made in
the will. After the death 'of the testator, the daughter married and
died, leaving issue. The condition in restraint of marriage was void,
and it was held that upon the true construction of the codicil, the
property was to go over on her death or marriage only if she should
die without issue).
r2 p. 667.
53The writer is unable to interpret the language of Lord Dunedin
later used in his summarization, p. 671, where he seems to distinguish
between implied revocation and revocation by inconsistency and says
that in the latter case there is no revocation if the inconsistent pro-
vision is inoperative.
"P. 763.
-In 6th ed., pp. 169-170.
-Supra, n. 42.
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Lord Blanesburgh5 7 agreed with the majority so far as this
particular claimant is concerned who would take under either
provision. He says that if the later will gives the property to
a different person or for a purpose different from that declared
in the first one, then there is a revocation as clearly as if ex-
press revocatory words had been used, and he limits for him-
self the rule that there is no revocation to the facts of this case
and does not place his decision on general grounds. 58
The three latter opinions all discuss Roper v. Radcliffe
and seek to explain it by its particular facts and to cut down its
implications. It will be noted then that of the five opinions, two
adopted the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, two held
there was no revocation where the later provision is inoperative
and one said there was no revocation by inconsistency so far as
this claimant was concerned, but affirmed that there is a revoca-
tion where the later provision is inconsistent, though inopera-
tive. Ward v. Van der Loeff may be regarded, as holding that
there is no revocation where the later provision is inoperative.
This means, at least so far as the opinions of former judges are
concerned, that the original stands, though the later provision is
inconsistent.
It must be admitted that there is even more doubt about the
result in the American cases. Sometimes an inoperative Will is
regarded as being similar in effect to a will invalidly executed. 60
This seems to mean that there is no distinction between invalidity
in execution and ineffectiveness in cases where there is a valid
execution. It of course may be suggested that unless a validly
executed will contains a revocatory clause or is sufficient in its
attempt to dispose of the property, it does not remove the estate
or part of it from the grip of the earlier wi] 6 1 Whether there
is an intent to revoke is said to be a jury question. 62 But it is
more commonly held that there is an inconsistency which may be
the exact equivalent of a revocatory clause, though the incon-
57P. 681.
NP. 685.
" upra, n. 156
"Boylan v. Meeker, 28 N. 3. L. 274 (1860); Dower v. Seeds, 28
W. Va. 113 (1886) (dictum).
Cf. suggestion in 33 Harv. L. Rev. 337, 353 (1920).
'Barksda7e v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332 (1857); Wolfe's Will, 185 N. C.
563, 117 S. E. 804 (1923). In England the question is decided by the
probate court. Jenner v. Finch, supra, n. 16.
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sistent provisions are inoperative. Our courts commonly take
one of three views, either that there is a conditional, or an abso-
lute revocation,63 or no revocation.
The question of revocation by inoperative later instrument
has arisen in many jurisdictions in this country, and it has arisen
with especial frequency in New York and Pennsylvania. The
later instrument may affect (a) private gifts, and (b) charities,
and it is convenient to deal with them in this way.
With respect to private gifts, in the first place the inoperative
will probably revokes the prior gift in all cases where there is
a revocatory clause.6 4 This holding seems sufficient to show that
we cannot solve the general problem by the inquiry whether the
revocation is or is not conditional. An implied condition can
be read into such a revocatory clause as well as into a mere in-
consistency.0 5
Secondly, there is a revocation in the majority of states if
the later inoperative provision is essentially different from the
former.66 But if the inoperative provision purports to give the
property to the same beneficiary, the former provision is not
3Laughton v. Atkins, 1 Pick. 535 (Mass. 1823) (dictum); Lougee
v. WiZkie, 209 Mass. 184, 95 N. E. 221 (1911) (See comment in 40 I-arv.
L. Rev. 71, 102 (1926); 25 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 263 (1927)., rones v.
Murphy, 8 Watts & S. 275 (1844) (dictum); Marx Estate, supra, 3. 39
(The second will was partly inoperative because it contained an exces-
sive gift to charity. It purported to make a complete disposition of the
property. The legacies of the earlier will omitted in the later one could
be paid out of the funds ineffectively given to charity. Held, the
second will is not inconsistent with the first and the legaciel
should be paid). An interesting result was reached in Re Rose, 273
P. 92 (Cal. App. 1928). The first will provided a specifid legacy for
a son. The later will overlooked him entirely. The effect was that the
son took such share as he would have had if the testator had died
intestate.
C6 onway v. Fulmer, 172 Ala. 283, 54 So. 624, 34 L. R. A. N. S. 963(1911); In re Rose, supra, n. 63; Barksdale v. Hopkins, supra, n. 62;
Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357 (1863); Dudley v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440,
83 N. W. 97, 86 N. W. 959 (1901); Rice Go. v. Scott, 88 Minn..386, 93
N. W. 109 (1903); Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276 (1855); Vining
v. Hall, 40 Miss. 83 (1866); Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 A4 679(1914); Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. St. 177 (1871); Teacle's Estate, 153 Pa.
219, 25 A. 1135 (1893).
"Read v. Manning, 30 Miss. 308 (1855).
6Blakeman, v. Sears, 74 Conn. 516, 51 A. 517 (1902) (Inoperative
codicil made a radical change in the disposition from that in the will-
no general discussion); U. S. Fidelity Go. v. Douglas, 134 Ky. 374, 120
S. W. 328 (1909); Gossett v. Weatherly, 58 N. C. Eq. 46 (1859); Carpen-
ter v. MiZler, 3 W. Va. 174 (1869) (dictum).
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revoked. 67 Thus, in Re Pilsbury,5 the original will made a gift
of personalty to an illegitimate child. The second will likewise
provided for her, but the provision was invalid as a perpetuity.
If it revoked the earlier will, all the property would pass to the
legitimate children. It was held that though the later will must
be probated it would not revoke the former. The leading Ameri-
can case is Austin v. Oakes.s 9 It is almost identical with Duguid
Y. Praser,70 which it relied upon. The court declared that the
intention to revoke was conditional, but it also said, in substance,
that there was no revocation. "Can something be repugnant to
nothing and turn that nothing into something?" The two po-
sitions here taken are inconsistent with each other. It seems
clear that there was no conditional revocation. The testatrix
did not have the thought, either expressed or unexpressed: "The
instrument which I am executing shall have the effect of revok-
ing the former one only if it is operative and not otherwise."
She had no doubt about its operative effect.
The Charity Cases. If. the original gift were made to char-
ity and the codicil gave the property to a totally different but
illegal purpose, it is clear that there is an intention to revoke,
and we cannot say that if the later disposition cannot take effect
the testator desires to return to the earlier one. So if the will
makes a private distribution and the codicil makes an inopera-
tive gift to charity,7 ' there is a revocation because of the incon-
sistency. But suppose that by the will there is a gift to charity
and the codicil or later will gives the same property to the
same charity and the latter provision is inoperative because not
executed within the period required by statute for an effective
*'Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 A. 153 (1898) (Codicil
changed the absolute gift into a trust void because of the statute
against perpetuities).
"99 N. Y. S. 62 (App. D. 1906) (Cf. Altrock v. Vandenburghz, 25
N. Y. S. 851 (1893) (Substantially similar).
-117 N. Y. 577, 23 N. E. 193 (1890). In Freel v. Robinson, 18 0. L.
R. 651 (1909), however, it is said that the doctrine of dependent rela-
tive revocation is inapplicable .(a) where there are express words of
revocation, and (b) is applicable only where the revocation is by act
to the document because only such acts are equivocal in nature.
11 Supra, n. 46.
uMervne's Estate, supra, n. 64; Carpenter v. Miller, supra, n. 66
(The codicil revoked a private gift and devoted the property to en-
courage the preaching of the gospel).
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gift to charity, is the former will revoked? In Hoffner's Estate,72
the court held that the charity could not take under either will.
It seems that here is a fundamental error in the court's reason-
ing. It can scarcely be said that a will which makes the same
provision as the earlier will is inconsistent with it. An earlier
provision may become inoperative if the property passes under
the later one to the same beneficiary, but there is no incon-
sistency.73 With the proposition in mind that an earlier pro.
vision is inoperative but not revoked in cases where the later
provision gives the same property to the same beneficiary, the
authorities may be examined. It may be repeated that the as-
sumption here is that the later will contains no revocatory
clause.
The New York cases are irreconcilable inter se. Thus, in
Canfield v. Canfield,74 the testator devoted one-fourth of his
property to each of two local charities and one-half to a foreign
charitable institution. By a codicil executed within two months
of his death he directed that the three beneficiaries should share
equally. The statute did not apply to the foreign beneficiary,
so its share was cut down but not entirely revoked, whereas it
was held that the other two gifts were revoked If the theory
proposed herein were applied, that there is a revocation of the
will only to the extent that the codicil makes an inconsistent
though ineffective disposition, the second will not being incon-
sistent, there should be no revocation, as these two shares were
neither revoked nor cut down. Hayman's Estate75 may be re-
garded as following the same theory as was adopted in the
Canfield case and only a partial revocation should have been
declared. Certain charities were provided for in the will. The
inoperative codicil revoked the gifts to some of the charities
-"161 Pa. 331, 29 A. 33 (1894) (A constructive trust ultimately
was declared).
See especially O'Leary v. Douglass, 1 L. R. Ir. 115, 3 L. R. Ir. 323
(Ch., etc., 1878) (The second will without revocatory clause contained
a devise to charity, void because will was executed within three months
of death. It was identical with the first will and each made a com-
plete disposition of the estate. Held repetition of a gift does not show
an intent to revoke it and the gift under the former will stands. See
also, Birks v. Birkis, 4 Sw. & Tr. 31 (Ecc. 1865).
U 4 Dem. 111 (Sur. N. Y. 1885). See also Benedict's Win, 11 N. Y.
S. 252 (Sur. 1889).
I237 N. Y. S. 215 (Sur. 1929).
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and substituted others. So in Ela v. Megie,7e gifts were made to
eight charities. The inoperative second codicil reduced the be-
quest to three and dropped the other five. The court held that
this was no place to apply the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation and the earlier provisions were all revoked. Under
the view here proposed, there would be no revocation
as to any charitable gifts which were not mentioned and the
gifts which were simply cut down would pass under the original
instrument as so altered. That is, the earlier instrument stands
so far as it is consistent with the later one. A difficulty arising
from the doctrine of co.lditional revocation, that the court must
reject or sustain the earlier instrument in toto, is thus avoided.
On the other hand, a different result was reached in Re
.Farrners Loan & Trust Co. 7 7 The will gave the residue to vari-
ous charities. The inoperative codicil revoked the residuary
clause, but revived it so far as it applied to charities. The gift
to charities did not fail
The Pennsylvania cases also are not consistent with each
other. Thus, in Hoffner's Estate78 the inoperative codicil gave
the same sum to the same charity named in the original will.
If the court had adopted the view that a later will revokes an
earlier one only when it is inconsistent, the original gift would
have stood.
It seems now that Pennsylvania has pretty clearly about
faced in the matter. Thus, in a recent case it was held that a
gift to charity was not wholly defeated by an inoperative codicil
(will) which diminishes the legacy and also postpones the time
of enjoyment.7 9 In Sloaa's Appeal"0 where the inoperative
7 219 N. Y. 112, 113 N. E. 800 (1916).
122 N. Y. S. 956 (App. D. 1910).
Supra, n. 72; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857), would be
essentially similar were it not for the revocatory clause. See also
Lutheran-Appeal, 113 Pa. 32, 5 A. 752 (1886); Melville's Estate, supra,
n. 64; Teacle's Estate, supra, n. 64.
"Bingaman's Estate, 281 Pa. 497, 127 A. 73 (1924); see also Ap-
peal of Carl, 106 Pa. St. 635 (1884); Morrow's Estate, 204 Pa. 484, 54
A. 342 (reduction).
168 Pa. St. 422, 32 A. 42 (1895). Freel v. Robinson, supra, n. 69,
discussed In 5 So. Cal. L. Rev. 273, 288 (1931)1 is not dissimilar. T
from the residue left legacies to her sister and brother and nephew,
with the final residue to her sister. On the death of her brother, she
executed a codicil saying: "I revokd the above and give to my sister
all the money I now possess save the legacy named above to my
nephew." The sister's husband was an attester of the codicil. Held
legacy to the sister revoked. If a testator revokes a prior gift and gives
K E UC-Y LAw JounAh
codicil expressly revoked the earlier gift and gave a smaller sum
"instead thereof" there was no revocation but a mere cutting
down, inasmuch as the revocation was immediately qualified.
The result in this case is sound, since the earlier gift is not
wholly inconsistent with the later one. Stress was laid in
Bingaman's EstateSl upon the fact that the later instrument
was, in substance, a codicil and so should be more closely in-
terpreted with the will, but the fact that the later instrument
was a codicil is without significance in this case.
A difficulty arising under the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation has been mentioned above, -viz., that it requires either
a complete revocation or none at all. To make the argument for
a different view clear, the doctrine of dependent relative revoca-
tion should be stated. As first used, it signified a revocation in
which the revoking act was done with reference to another act
which act was meant to be an effectual disposition and which
will cause a revocation or not according to the efficacy of the
relative act. Professor Warren showed that this classification
was misleading and that two classes of cases were dealt with,
viz., conditional revocations and revocations under a mistake.
In either class the so-called revocation may be caused either by
act to the document or by subsequent writing. Under condi-
tional revocation, the testator is in doubt about the efficacy of
the relative act and impliedly revokes only on condition that the
relative act is efficacious. Illustrations of this are likely to be
exceedingly rare. It is unlikely that a testator would commune
with himself after this fashion: "I do not intend this act to be
a revocation, I am doing it expecting that it will constitute a
revocation only in the event that another instrument I have
executed [am now executing, or am about to execute" (the
relative act)] " shall prove ineffective." He would not likely
have it drawn in such a way that its effectiveness would be a
matter of doubt to himself. Where the revocation is made
"instead thereof" a sum greater or less, it is held that the words
"instead thereof" qualify the words of revocation so that the new gift
may still be effective up to but not more than the original gift, even
though the later gift is inoperative. It seems entirely clear here that
the later gift was given "instead thereof" and that there was no
sufficient reason why the original gift should not standt8 Supra, n. 79.
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under a mistake (the usual situation) Professor Warren shows 82
that courts have, in effect, set the revocation aside and have
thus reinstated the original will, This, he concludes, should be
done, if at a, only upon equitable grounds which are present
and are sufficient to warrant the court in believing that the
testator would not desire a revocation if he could be asked
about it. It would therefore be assumed that if the earlier will
gave the property to one person and the later, in effect, gave
it to another, there is no equitable ground for setting the latter
aside. The failure of the later gift does not indicate a desire of
testator to return to his original plan.
It seems that whether one says that the earlier will is con-
ditionally revoked or revoked under a mistake where there are
equitable grounds for setting the revocation aside, still if the
prior will stands, or is restored, it stands or is restored as an
entirety. Thus, in one case83 the testatrix gave the residue to
her uncle absolutely. The codicil cut this down to a life estate,
remainder to eharity, which latter gift was void. The court,
because the first beneficiary was testatrix' favorite uncle, held
that she meant to cut down the gift to him only if the gift over
could be effective. It seems clear that there was no feeling of
condition present in the mind of the testatrix. It accordingly
seems that the first will should operate only to the extent of its
consistency with the later one and that the remainder should
have been regarded as undisposed of. The adoption of the rule
of revocation under a mistake requires the court either to set
aside the revocation and restore the entire earlier will or else the
revocation stands and the earlier gift fails entirely. Professor
Warren alone, so far as this writer has founc suggests the
fourth view referred to above and thinks, in these cases where
the original provision has been allowed to stand, the courts
have unconsciously set aside the revocation. This, if done at all,
should be done only on equitable grounds where the intent of
the testator is reasonably apparent. Save in one case84 that
possibility has not been remotely referred to so far as this writer
has found. Rarely, save in this situation, have the courts,
U33 Harv. L. Rev. 337 (1920); 1 Page on Wills, §§ 449-453 (1928).
OElwell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S. W. 131 (1917), 5 A. L. R.
303. 4 Onions v. Tyrer, supra, n. 15.
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especially American courts, exercised the power of reformation
of wills and that is substantially what this view involves. It does
not seem that this group of cases which is so commonly placed
under the aegis of dependent relative revocation requires us to
say either that there is always a revocation, or no revocation,
or a conditional revocation, or that there was a revocation which,
on equitable principles, may be set aside. The principle of
inconsistency properly applied will frequently reach a similar
result, but probably not always so. If there is a revocation
it is either set aside or not set aside, but if we rely upon incon-
sistency, the prior gift may prevail wholly or only in part where
there is no inconsistency or a partial inconsistency. This writer
at this point desires to suggest that a modification of the
Warren theory be assumed, at least where the relative
act is not an act to the document but is a purported
revocation by a subsequent validly executed but inoperative dis-
position and contains no express words of revocation. It is this
that the earlier will should continue to be operative to the ex-
tent that it is consistent with the later will, but no further.
This view is implicit in the opinion of Lord Blanesburgh in
Ward v. Van der Leoff,85 where he agrees with the other four
judges in the result because the claimant comes within the class
created both by the will and the codicil. It is also intimated
in the opinion of Lord Dunedin.
This rule is implicit in many American cases but has been
occasionally confused as in Austin v. Oakes8a with (a) condi-
tional revocation and with (b) the idea that if the inconsistency
is inoperative it does not revoke at all (as in Marx' Estate)8 7
because it does not remove the property from the grip of the
earlier will. It is not believed that the adoption of this view
will remove all possible difficulties. It will, in general, ac-
complish the presumed intention of the testator. The only really
new proposal is that a later gift of the same thiug to the same
person should not be regarded as revocation of the earlier one.
It should rather be regarded as a ratification or reaffirmation
of it and the principle should not be limited to the cases where
the later instrument is a codicil. Naturally, difficult applica-
Supra, n. 42, at p. 681.
Supra, n. 69.
Supra, n. 39.
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tions of this principle of inconsistency may arise as where the
original gift is to a charitable institution for a named use and
the later inoperative will gives the same gift to the same institu-
tion for a different use. The proper result here is no more
difficult to reach than it is in other cases of inconsistency.
A recent writer regards Mr. Warren as all wrong, or nearly
o. 8 3 He says that Warren's theory of revoking under a mis-
take and setting aside the revocation where there are sufficient
reasons for so doing, is not even logical. His objection is that
after a will has been revoked it must be republished in order to
become again effective. He argues that since there is no repub-
lication it is therefore illogical to say that the former will be-
comes effective when the revocation is set aside. It seems im-
possible to agree with that view. The thing that happens when
a revocation is set aside is like that which happens when a con-
tract or any other document is wholly set aside. For the pur-
poses of the case, the former will is thereafter to be regarded
as never having been revoked. It is entirely unsound to speak
of it as being "revived" for it has never been dead, that is to
say, the court's act in setting the revocation aside restores the
will to its first position.8 9
Incidentally, one must disagree with his conclusion reached
in the case of Lougee v. Wilkie,9" where the will made an abso-
lute gift to the beneficiary, but the codicil to which the bene-
ficiary was an attester cut this down to a life estate. Mr. Cornish
thinks that, on the principle of conditional revocation, the origi-
nal gift may stand. If this be merely a problem of dependent
relative revocation, one might argue, of course, that if the tes-
tator knew that the second gift could not be effective he would
prefer to have the original will and larger gift take effect. The
case would then be similar to those cases where, by act to the
document, the testator has canceled a gift to a legatee and inter-
lined a smaller gift; but the court said that "the provision of
the original will remains unchanged by this provision." It there-
fore follows the view later adopted in the majority opinion ex-
pressed in Ward v. Van der Loeff to the effect that 4 later in-
n Cornish, "Dependent Relative Revocation," 5 So. Cal. L. Rev. 273,
393 (1931).
"Spear v. Rosenhaus, 274 fI1. 237, 113 N. E. 622 (1916).
"Supra, n. 63.
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operative but inconsistent instrument does not revoke the former.
A more nearly sound and desirable result may be reached in this
case by saying either (a) that the codicil is valid and operative
because like an heir or distributee the attester is competent
where the act of attestation is an act against interest,9 1 or (b) if
the codicil is inoperative, still the original will is consistent
with it to the extent of awarding a life estate and is revoked
only as to the remainder.
The theory which this paper seeks to set forth is that a
subsequent inoperative will revokes the prior will only to the
extent of its inconsistency (when there are no express revoca-
tory words). Thus, the cutting down of a prior gift is not an
entire revocation. Unless the later will is operative, the earlier
one never ceased to be at least partially operative.
A test of this theory may be suggested. Suppose that cer-
tain dispositions of an earlier will are repeated verbatim (or in
part) in a later will and are not intended (by hypothesis) to be
cumulative. Assume also that the later will is revoked by de-
structive act,92 -what effect will this revocation of the later will
have upon the earlier one . The common assumption is that the
earlier will became revoked and so would not in many jurisdic-
tions be revived. It may be argued against the present theory
that if the earlier will merely became inoperative instead of
revoked, it becomes operative when the later will is out of the
-way, and this conflicts with principle as well as with authority.
The answer would be that nothing has happened which makes
the inoperative will again operative and the result is the same
as if it were regarded as revoked. On the other hand, in states
where revival is permissible, the earlier will would again be-
come operative. Hence, the test applied does not conflict with
the theory proposed.
The Residuary Clause. The common statement that where
there are two wills the former is revoked only in case of absolute
necessity and the two are to be probated together to the extent
possible is to be qualified by two considerations. One of them
is suggested by the inquiry as to what is to be done where the
second will repeats, alters or omits some provisions in the former
01 See 25 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 251.
"
2M'Ara v. M'Cay, L. R. 23 Ir. 138 (1889).
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will. Are those dispositions repeated or altered to be regarded
as cumulative and are those omitted to be regarded as still
operative? Secondly, in such case, does the presence or absence
of a residuary clause affect the result? Godolphin93 says:
"If a certain quantity be twice bequeathed, it is twice due, unless
the last will of the testator were expressed with an intent of ademption
of the first. Understand this, when it is in two distinct writings as in
a testament and a codicil-for the twice bequeathing to the same
person the same quantity in the same writing doth not duplicate the
legacy; otherwise, if it be in two such distinct writings as aforesaid."
Under the early view no revocatory effect is necessarily as-
signed to the residuary clause in the later instrument. The
former gifts either repeated, altered or omitted in the later will
might still be subtracted before claims should be asserted under
the residuary clauseY4 Yet almost without exception the pres-
ence of a residuary clause in the later will has been given the
exact force of a revocatory clause. The courts say that the
later will suffices to dispose of all the property and so is wholly
inconsistent with the earlier will.9 5
"Supra, n. 21.
" Adams v. Maris, 213 S. W. 622 (1919) Tex. Com. App. (A holo-
graphic will gave certain notes to A and B. A later will gave a legacy
to C and "all the rest to my bodily heirs." Held the residuary legatees
should not prevail over A and B.
9In re Danford's Estate, 196 Cal. 339, 238 P. 76 (1925) (Earlier
will without residuary clause, provided two general legacies and divided
the residue between A and B. A codicil provided legacy for C. The
later will revoked expressly the gift to C, gave legacies to D and E and
gave the residue to X. It is submitted that the express revocation of
the gift to C and the implied revocation of the gift of the residue to A
and B, should leave the two general legacies untouched); Lasier v.
Wright, 304 Il. 130, 136 N. E. 545 (1922); Neibling v. Methodist Ass'n,
315 Mo. 578, 286 S. W. 58 (1926), 51 A. L. R. 639 (The later will re-
peated some, altered some and omitted some of the earlier provisions.
The same executor was named in each will, but the residuary bene-
ficiaries in the later will were different persons. The first will was pre-
served and the testator intended both to stand. Held revoked. The
will Is so free from doubt that parol evidence of intent cannot be ad-
mitted); Simmons v. Simmons, 26 Barb. 68 (N. Y. 1857); In re Gilman,
supra, n. 30 (The great change in circumstances and the significant
variations in the second will seem sufficient to warrant a revocation
entirely apart from the residuary clause); Daugherty v. Holscheider,
88 S. W. 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905); Be Fisher, 4 Wis. 254 (1854)
(Each will contained a residuary clause, one residuary beneficiary being
added to those named in the first will. The other legacies were varied
in form and amount. The court evidently concludes that there was no
Intent of cumulation and says that there cannot be two wills when each
purports to be complete and distinguishes Holley v. Hatton, Dickens
461 (Ch. 1784) where there was no residuary claus% and the second in-
strument was a codicil.
K. L. J.-3
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As to cumulation, where there is no residuary clause, it is
to be noted. that Godolphin says it does not occur (a) where the
testator intends a substitution and (b) it occurs if at all only
where there are two different writings "as in a testament or a
codicil." Whether a substitution or a cumulation is intended
is not a matter of integration primarily but rather one of con-
struction, but the probate court has followed the practice of
treating the matter as involving the process of integration.
Again Godolphin's illustration of the second writing is a codicil
rather than a will. It may be assumed as the settled rule that
there is no cumulation where the later will contains a residuary
clause and that such a clause is the substantial equivalent of a
revocatory clause.
Executors Named in Earlier Will but Not Named in the
Later Inconsistent W471. It is sometimes declared that if the
dispositions of the later will are entirely inconsistent with those
of the earlier will, such earlier will is wholly revoked, though
it contains an appointment of executors and the later one does
not.9 6
The leading authority in England is Henfrey v. Henfrey.97
The later will declared, "all I possess in this world I give to my
-wife."98  A gift of "all I possess" has the effect both of a
specific and a residuary bequest. But it operates on the prop-
erty only. This case held that though the prior will named
executors and the later one did not, still the earlier will could not
be probated even to the extent of the nomination of executors.
The reason assigned by Sir Herbert Jenner-Fust was that the
naming of executors was an appointment of property, and since
the property was all given to the wife, the nomination failed.
This reason is purely historical and does not now prevail, either
in England or here where personal representatives receive com-
pensation or fees. If we are to assume that all wills not clearly
contradictory are to be construed together because that is the
presumed intent of the testator, is there any present reason to
51 A. L. R. 681 (1927) 1 Jarman on Wills (7th ed. 1930) 162; 1
Williams on Executors (2d ed. 1930) 103. But in Deppen v. Deppen,
132 Ky. 755, 117 S. W. 352 (1909) the later will (codicil) revoked the
earlier dispositive provisions but named no executor and, the earlier
appointment was not revoked.
112 Curt. 468 (Ece. 1842).
08 Dempsey v. Lawson, supra, n. 3L
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follow the Henfrey case? 99 There is some English authority
the other way.10 0 But the leading American ease is RBe
1burg,°10 which holds squarely on the point that if the entire
property is disposed of by an inconsistent second will, the
appointment of executors in the first will is revoked also, though
no reference is made to the appointment. It cites the Henfrey
case and two American cases in point.10 2
It is submitted that there is no occasion longer to follow
such a rule. There is no appropriate distinction between the
disposition of property and the naming of executors in respect
to revocation, and a testamentary provision should not be re-
voked unless the inference of revocation is a necessary one. The
argument sometimes made that a complete inconsistency in the
dispositions made is equivalent to an express revocation of the
appointment, or that the duties of an executor are confined to
the will by which he is appointed, is simply assertion 0 3 A
revocatory clause applies to the dispositions and to the appoint-
ment, but inconsistency in dispositions applies only to the
property. So if the argument that the duties of an executor
-are limited by the will naming him is sound, should we not also
hold that a codicil making entirely different dispositions from
those in the will should also revoke the appointment, though it
does not name executors? Yet that is not the rule.
The Evidence to Establish Revocation Appearing in a Lost
Will. Two interesting situations have arisen: (a) Suppose a
lost but unrevoked will cannot be established with respect to its
dispository provisions because of the statutory requirement of
two witnesses. May its revocatory effect arising either from its
inconsistency with an earlier, existing will, or from the presence
of a revocatory clause, be established by evidence sufficient at
" Note that the later English cases cited in support of It are dis-
tinguishable except Goods of Turnour, 56 L. T. 344 (1886), e. g., Cot-
trefl v. Cottrell, L. R. 2 P. & D. 397 (1872) contained a revoking clause.
Goods of McFarlane, 13 L. R. Ir. 264 (1884) (No appointment in either
will); O'Leary v. Douglass, 3 L. R. Ir. 323 (1878) (Wills were exact
duplicates); Pepper v. Pepper, I. R. 5 Eq. 85 (1870) (Same persons
named executors In both wills).
'" Goods of Griffith, L. R. 2 P. & D. 457 (The two wills were pro-
bated by consent of the parties); Goods of Leese, 2 S. W. & Ir. 442
(Eccl. 1862).
1I'Supra, n. 39.
I" Henfrey v. Henfrey, supra, n. 97.
""Kearns v. Roush, supra, n. 39; Gensimore's Estate, 246 Pa. 216,
92 A. 134 (1914).
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common law, so that it will defeat the earlier will? (b) Suppose
a later lost will is presumptively revoked because it cannot be
traced beyond the possession of the testator, or suppose the later
will was revoked by testator's known destructive act during his
life. Can proof of its inconsistency or of the presence of a
revocatory clause be established by evidence sufficient at com-
mnon law, though the statute requires the evidence of two wit-
nesses to prove the contents of a lost unrevoked will? The
policy underlying the statute is to prevent the establishment
of a lost will by perjured evidence. 10 4 One would suppose that
there is a similar policy in preventing a fraudulent revocation
of the earlier will.05 It seems unfortunate to establish different
rules of evidence for cases so similar, yet that has in fact been
done.' 06 But a revocation in an unrevoked, lost will requires
the same quantity of evidence as is required to establish the
dispository provisions.10 7
The revoking clause may be proved alone, however, even
though evidence is lacking as to the dispository provisions. 0 8
There is a conflict as to the way the evidence may be used. It is
sometimes held that a mere revocation is not testamentary and
should not be probated. 0 9 If the revocation is contained with-
10,7 Corn. L. Q. 69 (1922).
'
0 4 Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1338, now § 350 Cal. Probate Code
(1931) (Statute applies to a lost or destroyed will proved to be in
existence at death of testator or fradulently destroyed, etc., during his
lifetime without his knowledge, requires two witnesses. Hence, it does
not necessarily apply to situation (b).
106 Bassett's Estate, 196 Cal. 576, 238 P. 666 (1925), Civil Code 1296-7,
1844 (For a revoked lost will a single witness is sufficient to show that
it revoked a prior will by inconsistency therewith). In re Johnson's
Estate, 188 Cal. 336, 206 P. 628 (1922) Presence of revocatory clause
proved by one witness). See accord. Wear's Will, 116 N. Y. S. 304 (App.
D. 1909). In Harris v. Harris, 26 N. Y. 433 (1863), the contents of a
will fraudulently destroyed during testator's lifetime could not 'be
proved under the statute by one witness, but that was held to apply to
probate and not to suits between claimants of property; Cahill's Con-
solidated Laws of New York (1930), Chap. 13, Sec. 204.
0TIn re Thompson's Estate, 185 Cal. 763, 198 P. 795; Dingman v.
Dingman, 199 Mich. 384, 165 N. W. 712 (1917)-Same rule, though
statute was passed after the execution of the will. See Compiled Laws
of Michigan, sec. 15548 (1929).
181n re Cunningham, 38 Minn. 169, 36 N. W. 269 (1888) (Rule of
dependent relative revocation held inapplicable); Brackenridge v.
Roberts, 114 Tex. 418, 267 S. W. 244 (1924), 270 S. W. 1001 (1925) (re-
voking clause could be proved but none of the remainder of the later
will).104 Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. St. 177 (1871).
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in an existing will which is capable of presentation for probate,
it is held that the revocation of the earlier will cannot be es-
tablished without offering the entire will for probate.1 10 But
if the revocation lies in a lost will whose contents cannot be
proved save that the revocation is provable or if the revocation
lies in another writing not a will, such evidence is admissible
to resist probate of an earlier will."1
The Probate of a Mere Revocation. The question often
arises, how is the evidence of revocation by subsequent writing
to be introduced, that is, must such revocatory instrument be
probated in order to establish it with judicial effect, or may it
be introduced as any other written evidence would be in the
course of the hearing on the will?
There is probably no conflict in the authorities that a will
may be revoked by a later will which is now lost, which con-
tained a revocatory clause, without probate of such lost will or
clause in it.112 But the question arises, just what use is to be
made of a properly executed revocation (other writing) which
contains no disposition of property nor appointment of executors
or guardian. Formerly in England, administration was granted
with the revoking paper annexed.' 3 The present English prac-
tice is that the revocatory paper is not probated, but it is intro-
duced in evidence to defeat a will offered for probate, and for
the purpose of obtaining letters of administration. 114
"o Wallis v. Waflis, 114 Mass. 510 (1874); Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa.
St. 177 (1871) (another writing containing a revocation need not be
probated, but if revocation is in a will it must be offered for probate
or revocation fails); Stickney v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 116- (1884) (An
appeal had been taken from the probate of the revoking will, which was
not defended by the executor and devisees, and an order was entered
disallowing probate for that reason. Thereafter, when the earlier will,
containing similar provisions, was offered for probate, the widow offered
to prove revocation by the later will. Held proof not admissible, since
the entire will could not be proved); Lyon v. Dada, 127 Mich. 395, 86
N. W. 946 (1901). Denial of probate of later will is res adjudicate also
as to the revocation.
"'Stevens v. IEope, 52 Mich. 65, 17 N. W. 698 (1883) (Revocatory
paper, even one capable of probate, may be used as evidence of revoca-
tion, though not offered for probate); Day v. Day, 2 Green 549 (N. J. Eq.
1831) (Revocation in a lost will may be used as evidence without pro-
bate). Cf. Helyar v. Helyar, 1 Cas. Temp. Lee 472 (1754).
2Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W. 705 (1903).
1'Goods of Hubbard, L. R. 1 P. & D. 53 (1865). See Goods of
Durance, supra, n. 11, and Re McNeil, 45 N. B. 479, 42 D. L. R. 449
(1918), for form of order.
n' Toomer v. Sobinska, supra, n. 11. See also for form of order,
Goods of Eyre (1905) 2 I. R. 540 and 16 Halsbury's Laws of England,
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It is not clear in some American states holding that such a
writing may be probated whether or not probate is required."&
In some it is clear, revocation may be established without
probate,' 16 while in others perhaps probate is required.117 The
practice seems to be that if the instrument is in form a will and
not merely revocatory, its validity must be tried in a proceeding
to probate it, but if it is lost and its contents are incapable of
proof for purposes of probate, the presence of a revocatory
clause in it may be established, for the purpose of showing a
revocation, without probate.1 8  If probate has been refused in
a prior action for any reason, the decree is res adjudicata and
no use can be made of it to show revocation of an earlier will.11
That "this is my last will" is a mere form seems clear,
though some revocatory weight is still given to the form in a
few jurisdictions. Where a will contains a revocatory clause
the earlier will is revoked. The only way around the result is
to assume that the probate court has power to set the revocation
aside, thus placing the earlier will in such position as it would
have been if no revocation had ever been made. Where there
is no revocatory clause a residuary clause usually has the same
effect and is regarded as inconsistent with the giving of any
Executors and Administrators, 191. See also Goods of Hicks, L. R. 1
P. & D. 683 (1869) and Re Fraser, I R. 2 P. & D. 40 (1870).
n5 Grotts v. Cashburn, 295 Ill. 286, 129 N. E. 137 (1920); Pierce't
Estate, 63 Wash. 437, 115 P. 835 (1911).11
.state of Thompson, supra, n. 107; Stevens v. Hope, supra, n. 111;
Rudy v. Ulrich, supra, n. 110; NTelson v. McG-ffert, 3 Barb. 158 (N. Y.
Ch. 1848).
n' Newboles v. NewboZes, supra, n. 11. See 18 Mich. L Rev. 814; 2
Yale L. Jour. 941; Leard v. Askew, 28 Okla. 300, 114 P. 251 (1911).
ngWa~is v. WalZlis, supra, n. 110 (The proposition In Laughton v.
Atkins, supra, n. 63, that a will might not be provable because its at-
testers are all beneficiaries and therefore the revoking clause might be
presented in evidence independently would scarcely be urged now).
"9In Stickney v. Hammond, supra, n. 110, there were two wills
each containing a revocatory clause, and they were exactly alike save
that the latter exempted the executor from the obligation of furnishing
sureties. The latter one was probated and an appeal from probate was,
taken by the heirs. The executors and devisees declined to defend
against the appeal and an order was entered sustaining the appeal,
thus reversing the probate decree. When the prior will was offered for
probate, the later will was offered in evidence to show revocation of it.
This evidence was rejected and the former decree was held to be re-
adjudicata since the clause cannot be used in evidence without probate
of it. See accord. Lyon v. Dada, supra, n. 110.
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effect to an earlier will. Thus, there is no opportunity for
cumulation, or payment of omitted bequests.
If the later will merely repeats the earlier one, it does not
revbke the latter. If it repeats some of the earlier provisions,
omits some, alters some, and inserts others, it cannot be fairly
said that those repeated are necessarily inconsistent and so re-
voked, nor that the altered ones are other than partly revoked,
nor that even the omitted ones are revoked without more, though
it must be said that a specific legacy first given to A and later
given to B is revoked by inconsistency. So if the repeated gift is
inoperative, wholly or in part, the earlier one continues opera-
tive to the extent that there is no conflict.
As to the repeated provisions, the earlier will is inoperative
rather than revoked if there is no cumulation. The probate
court is required in such a case to perform the functions of
integrating the testamentary papers and construing them. If
the two wills are wholly alike and cumulation is not intended,
there is no occasion to probate the earlier one, though it is in
fact immaterial whether or not probate of it is granted, save
that it may give a construction court an oppbrtunity to pass
upon the issue of cumulation. If they are partly alike but the
provisions are not cumulative, again there is no occasion to
probate the earlier one as to that repeated part and if pro-
bated, that part would still be inoperative. The rule seems to be
well settled that if a later will is consistent with the earlier one
only in that it names no executors, the earlier appointment is
revoked, though there be no revoeatory clause. There is gen-
erally no occasion to probate an instrument which is a mere
revocation, providing it may be used in evidence at the time
of the probate proceeding. In some states an inconsistent will
may be used the same way without probate.
